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Moon Hee Lee 
ABSTRACT—Before imposing liability for copyright infringement, a court 
analyzes whether the defendant’s allegedly infringing work is substantially 
similar to the copyright-holder plaintiff’s allegedly infringed work. This 
substantial similarity analysis broadly contains two steps. First, facts and 
ideas do not receive copyright protection and are filtered out. Second, the 
two works are compared to see if there is material overlap between the two 
works’ remaining creative expression—i.e., whether or not the two works 
are substantially similar. This two-step approach furthers the delicate dual 
goal of copyright law to keep ideas and facts freely available as raw 
material for creation while awarding an author copyright over particular 
creative expression. 
While this substantial similarity test is noncontroversial, drawing the 
elusive line between idea and expression has been challenging for the 
courts. This task is especially difficult in the context of pictorial, graphic, 
and sculptural (PGS) works. The substantial similarity test evolved largely 
in the context of literary works and is not perfectly transposable to PGS 
works. Courts have resorted to two pernicious tendencies in applying the 
substantial similarity test to PGS works. They have used either what this 
Note calls a “literal descriptive approach,” comparing identifiable objects 
across visual works, or a “myopic visual approach,” comparing abstract 
visual components such as colors and shapes across visual works. Both of 
these tendencies fail to approximate how human vision works. Instead of 
identifying objects first or seeing shapes and colors in isolation, visual 
experience is initially nonverbal and inherently contextual. A substantial 
similarity test divorced from visual perception may erroneously draw the 
line between copyright protection and no protection, deviating from the 
idea–expression divide.  
Drawing on the science of visual perception and the nature of artistic 
training, this Note proposes an alternate framework for substantial 
similarity analysis of PGS works. In this truly visual substantial similarity 
test, the first filtration step would sieve out what this Note calls “perceptual 
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facts” often reflected in artistic techniques. Visual works would then be 
compared in terms of how perceptual facts were combined to form an 
aesthetic, visual composition. This approach correctly conceptualizes the 
visual idea–expression divide and therefore allows meaningful protection 
for copyright holders without removing raw material for creativity from 
subsequent creators.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In February 2015, a photo of a simple wedding dress went viral and 
challenged our notion of visual objectivity.1 As it “caught fire across the 
Internet,” opposing camps emerged, one claiming the dress was gold and 
white while another insisting it was blue and black.2 This heated debate 
attracted manifold participants—including celebrity Taylor Swift and 
Senator Christopher Murphy—each “convinced that he, or she, was right.”3 
Even scientists were initially stumped. It was not obvious why a seemingly 
objective fact resulted in diverging perceptions.4  
Neuroscientists finally concluded that dearth of contextual 
information caused different people to “pick up on different visual cues” in 
the brain, which then led to different color interpretations.5 If the brain 
perceived the dress to be in the shadow, the dress would look gold and 
white.6 If, on the other hand, the brain perceived the color of the dress to 
have been washed out in a brilliantly lit room, the clothing would look blue 
and black, the dress’s actual colors.7 This recent social media episode 
underscores the fact that we perceive colors in context.8 
For example, we never see “blue” in isolation—there simply is not 
such a thing in the perceptual brain. Instead, the brain calculates and 
concludes “blue” based on the colors surrounding the patch of color our 
brain is trying to identify. Indeed, technically identical color patches may 
look different depending on what surrounds them.9 A color patch 
surrounded by dark values might seem, for example, much brighter than the 
same one surrounded by lighter values. Similarly, a color patch surrounded 
by warm colors may look cooler than if it were surrounded by cool tones 
1 Jonathan Mahler, The White and Gold (No, Blue and Black!) Dress That Melted the Internet, N.Y.





5 See Jonathan Corum, Is That Dress White and Gold or Blue and Black?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 




8 E. H. GOMBRICH, ART AND ILLUSION: A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PICTORIAL
REPRESENTATION 298 (Princeton Univ. Press, Millennium ed. 2000) (1960) (“[T]he retina itself . . . 
does not react to individual stimuli of light . . . but to their relationship, or gradients.”). 
9 Two fields of color that emit the exact same wavelengths can appear to the eye to be quite 
different by manipulating the surround. DALE PURVES ET AL., NEUROSCIENCE 246 (5th ed. 2012). 
Conversely, two fields of colors that emit different wavelengths can seem like the same color to the eye 
also by manipulating the surround. Id. 
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because our brain is tuned to measure contrast.10 This idea of seeing 
contrasts pervades all of visual perception. From seeing colors to an 
object’s detailed features, we see measured differences rather than the 
absolutes. And artists have deftly manipulated this foundational principle 
of visual perception to create aesthetic expression, conveying a visual 
message by controlling the ultimate visual experience.11 
The legal test courts use to compare visual works, however, does not 
reflect this inherently relational nature of visual perception. To determine 
an infringement of a copyright, courts compare two works to see whether 
the defendant took “constituent elements of the [plaintiff’s] work.”12 The 
key issue is whether the allegedly infringing work is “substantially similar” 
to the allegedly infringed work.13 Before determining substantial similarity, 
the comparison test requires filtering out components that are outside the 
scope of copyright protection. These unprotectible aspects, such as facts 
and ideas, are left in the public domain for everyone, such as subsequent 
artists, to use.14 Therefore, the first key step in designing a substantial 
similarity test is to design a sieve with appropriate-sized openings to filter 
unprotectible elements and keep the protectible expressions. 
To date, courts have grasped for, but have not been able to fathom a 
reliable test for visual works. Unfortunately, the substantial similarity test 
as applied to visual works is unwieldy and unworkable in all circuits.15 A 
functional and meaningful substantial similarity test should be based on 
visual, not literal, language—one that reflects the nature of visual 
perception. However, courts have not been successful in coming up with a 
truly visual test. Instead, many courts have tried to awkwardly transpose a 
test that has been developed for comparing literary works onto comparing 
visual works. 
One consequence of using nonvisual test is that courts now 
ineffectually sieve unprotectible visual elements. This Note identifies two 
10 Id. 
11 In describing the “artist’s gift,” E. H. Gombrich has remarked the following: An artist “has 
learned to look critically, to probe his perceptions by trying alternative interpretations both in play and 
in earnest.” The artist achieves the “means of illusion” through his painting. GOMBRICH, supra note 8, 
at 313. 
12 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); see also 3 WILLIAM F.
PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:126, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2016) (noting that this is “a 
formulation that has been widely followed”). 
13 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (explaining that the central 
inquiry to determine infringement of an exclusive right is “whether the part so taken is ‘substantial’”). 
14 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
15 See 4-13 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[E][1], 
LexisNexis (database updated 2016). 
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flawed approaches courts resort to in the absence of a usable test. Courts 
either rely on literal descriptions (e.g., an anthropomorphic star) or abstract 
visual components (e.g., a bordered square) to filter out unprotectible visual 
components before comparing literal16 and descriptive or abstract and 
visual components for substantial overlap of material expression.17  
Both of these approaches to substantial similarity have yielded absurd 
and arbitrary results.18 On the one hand, when courts use literal 
descriptions, they might be using a sieve with openings that are too large to 
filter unprotectible elements. After labeling an object or a feature, the brain 
erroneously thinks there are only a few ways to visually express it.19 This 
might mean courts are filtering out protectible visual expression that went 
into expressing the identifiable object in a particular way. On the other 
hand, when courts use abstract visual components, they might be engaging 
in a meaningless comparison because identifying a visual concept does not 
point to a particular expression. For example, a particular shade of blue can 
be created in many ways such that labeling a unit of comparison a “patch of 
blue” is ambiguous at best. Bemoaning the lack of a reliable substantial 
similarity test, academics like Rebecca Tushnet have gone so far as to 
propose that we simply give up on comparing visual works that are not 
near-exact copies.20 
This Note, however, demonstrates the feasibility of a truly visual 
comparison test that ensures appropriate filtering, guaranteeing meaningful 
copyright protection for visual works. Furthermore, the science of visual 
perception implies what this Note calls “perceptual facts,” perceptually 
based visual components that can then be used to design the appropriate 
unit of filtering for a truly visual test.21 
In the proposed test, instead of filtering out (1) the literal descriptions 
(dress) or (2) the abstract visual concepts (black–blue), perceptual facts 
(two patches of light and dark value) are filtered out as unprotectible visual 
16 Here and elsewhere throughout the Note, the word “literal” means literary, that is, literal means 
translated into words or concepts. The word “literal” is not used to mean “exactly the same” as often 
used in copyright law (e.g., “literal” copying) or in common usage (e.g., he “literally” assigned a 
hundred pages for today’s copyright class). 
17 See discussion infra Section I.C.2. 
18 See cases cited infra Section I.C.3. 
19 See discussion infra Section II.A. 
20 Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 
738–40 (2012). Tushnet, however, would still allow for comparison of near-exact copies of visual 
works. Id. at 739. 
21 The term “perceptual facts” indicates “facts” in a legal sense to distinguish the kinds of facts that 
would remain in the public domain as opposed to “expression” that would receive copyright protection. 
Therefore, perceptual facts would be any visual representation that mimics how the brain sees and 
would therefore flexibly evolve as perceptual science develops. 
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facts. In effect, the openings of the substantial similarity sieve are set large 
enough for perceptual facts to pass through, but small enough for the 
expressive components (the combination of values, hues, and intensity to 
create a coherent image of a particular figure in the foreground against a 
particular background) to remain. By filtering out unprotectible perceptual 
facts—common artistic techniques that mimic the visual experience—while 
protecting the original expression in how these techniques were combined 
in novel ways to form an image, the test proposed in this Note furthers 
copyright law’s dual goals of protecting expression while keeping abstract 
ideas and facts in the public domain.22 In other words, this test would allow 
anyone to acquire and use artistic tools while having an exclusive right in 
the ultimate composition that he or she creates. 
This Note progresses in three Parts. Part I catalogs the tests and 
tendencies in the current substantial similarity analysis of visual works. 
Part II develops the idea of perceptual facts mirrored in visual techniques, 
using as support scientific findings and artistic processes. Finally, Part III 
offers an improved substantial similarity analysis that is visually and 
scientifically grounded. This would ensure meaningful copyright protection 
with appropriate filtration at the idea–expression divide. 
I. SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY ANALYSIS IN PICTORIAL, GRAPHIC,
AND SCULPTURAL WORKS 
Visual works receive copyright protection under the category of 
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural (PGS) works.23 This Part analyzes the 
persistent and thorny problem of copyright infringement analysis for PGS 
works, particularly with respect to the substantial similarity test. First, this 
Note will delineate the requirements for proving copyright infringement; 
second, it will catalog the courts’ approach to the substantial similarity 
element; finally, it will demonstrate why the current approach is flawed in 
its application to PGS works. 
22 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such 
work.”). This idea–expression distinction is echoed in 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2016) with concrete 
examples. 
23 PGS works are one of many categories of “works of authorship” in the Copyright Code. 
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5). The Copyright Code defines PGS works to “include two-dimensional and three-
dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions.” Id. 
§ 101. The focus of this Note will be two-dimensional works, although the insights may apply equally
to three-dimensional sculptural works. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 1992)
(“Protection under the copyright statute extends to pictorial works.” (citation omitted)); Folio
Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A] drawing . . . is copyrightable by
its author, who is defined as the ‘originator’ or ‘maker.’” (citation omitted)).
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A. The Law: Substantial Similarity as a Copyright Infringement Element
A copyright owner has a bundle of exclusive rights: reproduction,
distribution, derivative works, and performance rights.24 Copyright 
protection for PGS works adhere to “original works of authorship fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression.”25 Artistic merit is not required; the 
courts early on declined to adjudicate aesthetic value.26 The bars for 
fixation,27 authorship,28 and originality29 are also quite low. Copyright 
protection, however, extends only to the creative expression “that display[s] 
the stamp of the author’s originality.”30 In so doing, copyright law strives 
for a precarious balance in what is referred to as the idea–expression 
dichotomy: a copyright must simultaneously protect expression and 
promote the free dissemination of ideas.31 
An aggrieved copyright owner may enforce his or her exclusive 
right(s) by bringing a copyright infringement suit against an infringer.32 To 
establish a case for copyright infringement, the plaintiff must prove the 
following three elements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, (2) actual 
copying, and (3) actionable copying.33 Put another way, the copyright 
24 § 106. 
25 Id. § 102(a). 
26 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). In Bleistein, Justice 
Holmes famously announced, “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law 
to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and 
most obvious limits.” Id. 
27 § 101 (“A work is ‘fixed’ . . . when [it] is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 
(emphasis added)). But see Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 304 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding 
that a garden, inexorably changing, is not fixed, suggesting that some artistic medium may elude 
copyright’s fixation requirement). 
28 Authorship is imputed unless a work is a slavish replication of reality. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 55 (1884) (holding that a portrait photographer’s posing, 
lighting, and composing of the subject constitutes authorship); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 
Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1951) (holding that mezzotints of oil paintings deviated sufficiently from 
the paintings to constitute authorship). 
29 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (setting a low bar for 
originality by stating that only “a modicum of creativity” is required for a copyright (emphasis added)). 
30 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985). 
31 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that the public domain is “the 
inheritance of everyone”). 
32 The copyright holder, however, must meet the administrative formality laid out in 17 U.S.C. 
§ 411(a) to initiate a copyright lawsuit.
33 The courts have had trouble separating the striking similarity related to actual copying and the
substantial similarity related to actionable copying. This resulted in conflating actual and actionable 
copying, and collapsing them into a single step in many circuits. See NIMMER, supra note 15, 
§ 13.03[A] (“[T]he term ‘substantial similarity’ often is invoked as a proxy to prove copying as a
factual proposition.”). For example, in Stuff v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 342 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1965),
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holder must show both that copying has occurred (actual copying) and that 
the copied work is “substantially similar” to the original copyrighted piece 
(actionable copying). 
A plaintiff must prove actual copying—also referred to as copying-in-
fact—to disprove parallel independent creation by the defendant.34 Since 
direct evidence of copying is rare,35 actual copying is generally established 
using circumstantial evidence of access and striking similarity.36 Most 
circuits allow expert testimony on the issue of striking similarity—whether 
coincidence can explain the overlap between two works.37 Copying-in-fact 
is not by itself actionable. After establishing this “unauthorized use of a 
copyrighted work,” the copyright holder must next show that the use is 
“significant enough to constitute infringement.”38 In other words, in 
addition to showing that copying has actually occurred, the copyright 
holder must also prove “substantial similarity in the expression between the 
works” to establish actionable copying.39 This is a question of fact in which 
the court asks whether “the accused’s work is so similar to plaintiff’s 
work” that a lay observer would conclude that material appropriation of 
“substance and value” has occurred.40 
The substantial similarity requirement anticipates three instances 
where actual copying does not rise to the level of infringement. In the first 
scenario, the principle that the law does not concern itself with trifles (de 
minimis non curat lex) applies to copyright law; only copying “done to an 
unfair extent” results in infringement liability.41 In the second scenario, the 
copying is more than de minimis but trivial—i.e., the copying was not done 
to the substantial extent—and therefore does not result in liability.42 In the 
the Second Circuit restated the test of infringement in a way that concealed the substantial 
similarity requirement: “When plaintiff proved her ownership of the validly issued copyright 
and defendants’ copying of the work, she established a prima facie case of infringement under 
the statute.” This language was picked up in subsequent panel opinions and is, on occasion, still 
recited.
PATRY, supra note 12, § 9:143 (footnotes omitted). 
34 In the case of parallel independent creation, the second author has also created protectible 
expression. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951). 
35 Cf. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 307 (“[T]his case presents the rare scenario where there is direct 
evidence of copying.”). 
36 Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 2004). 
37 Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992). 
38 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2004). 
39 See PATRY, supra note 12, § 9:130. 
40 Id. 
41 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193 (citation omitted). 
42 No liability would attach even if the alleged infringer only copied expression because the amount 
copied is not substantial. 
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third and final scenario, though there was actual copying, what was copied 
was not part of the plaintiff’s original expression—that is the copied 
aspects of the work fall outside the copyright’s scope—and the copying 
therefore not unlawful.43 
Substantial similarity analysis necessarily requires filtering out these 
unprotectible components. The constitutional directive to “promote the 
Progress of Science and the useful Arts” requires a “limit on the scope of 
an author’s control” so that a copyright holder cannot “prevent subsequent 
authors from using concepts, ideas, or facts contained in his or her work.”44 
Otherwise, every creator must reinvent the wheel, independently making 
what has already been produced, severely hindering innovation.45 
Substantial similarity guards the boundary of copyright protection. Yet, 
designing a precise method for substantial similarity analysis has been “one 
of the most difficult questions in copyright law, and one that is the least 
susceptible of helpful generalizations.”46 
B. The Elusive Standard: Measuring Substantial Similarity
One purpose of the substantial similarity analysis is to separate idea 
from expression in a given work.47 The courts have struggled mightily with 
the august task of designing a substantial similarity sieve with openings 
that are just big enough to filter out unprotectible elements and leave intact 
protectible expression. Although circuits vary in their approach to 
substantial similarity analysis,48 the dominant model is the Second Circuit’s 
“abstraction test.”49 This Note will therefore describe the Second Circuit’s 
evolving approach and use this test as a model. 
43 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985). 
44 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 582 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
45 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 582. 
46 See NIMMER, supra note 15, § 13.03[A].  
47 See supra Section I.A. 
48 See Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 719, 719 (2010) (noting “surprising differences in what exactly we mean by substantial 
similarity and how it is to be proven” across circuits). The Supreme Court has so far been silent on 
substantial similarity analysis, neither disapproving nor affirming the Second Circuit’s dominant model. 
See PATRY, supra note 12, § 9:120.  
49 Most circuits now follow some version of the Second Circuit’s abstraction test. The most 
significant deviation from the Second Circuit’s abstraction test is the Ninth Circuit’s two-step approach. 
In the Ninth Circuit, the extrinsic test first aims to “determine similarity in general ideas,” and the 
intrinsic test then “compare[s] the particular expression used.” See NIMMER, supra note 15, 
§ 13.03[A][1][c]. This test has been criticized as complicated and difficult to apply. See PATRY, supra
note 12, § 9:235. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit itself has admitted that no one “has been able to improve
upon Judge Learned Hand’s famous ‘abstractions test.’” Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977). The Eighth Circuit uses the Ninth Circuit test,
while the Sixth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit use an approach similar to the Ninth Circuit test. See
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The Second Circuit’s abstraction test has evolved since the 1930s 
when Judge Learned Hand first took a stab at designing a workable 
substantial similarity test.50 First, he observed that when two works are 
compared at increasing degrees of abstraction, there would inevitably be a 
point at which the two works are similar.51 Some works, for example, might 
be similar only at a highly general level, such as a shared subject matter 
(abstraction step).52 This overlap would then be beyond “a point in [a] 
series of abstractions” at which the copyright holder can make a property 
claim.53 From this insight, Judge Learned Hand designed a substantial 
similarity test that would first filter out unprotectible components (filtration 
step) and then compare what remains for significant overlap (comparison 
step).54 
The Second Circuit has most recently modernized and clarified its 
substantial similarity test in the software context, and the other circuit 
courts have begun to use it in comparing PGS works.55 In Computer 
Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., the Second Circuit articulated 
three stages of the substantial similarity test: abstraction, filtration, and 
comparison.56 The filtration step requires sieving out components of the 
plaintiff’s works that would not receive copyright protection.57 Because 
overzealous filtration may filter out the expressive components, the 
filtration step is checked by considering whether a compilation of 
NIMMER, supra note 15, § 13.03[E][3][d]. For a more comprehensive circuit-by-circuit survey, see 
PATRY, supra note 12, §§ 9:128–9:278. 
50 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
51 Id. At some point, even the aspects of a work that the plaintiff created would be “too generalized 
an abstraction” and therefore “she could not keep it to herself.” Id. at 122.  
52 Id. at 121. 
53 Id. 
54 Id.; see NIMMER, supra note 15, § 13.03[A]. 
55 The Tenth Circuit, for example, performed the “abstraction-filtration-comparison analysis” to 
determine whether two visual works are substantially similar. See Close to My Heart, Inc. v. Enthusiast 
Media LLC, 508 F. Supp. 2d 963, 968 (D. Utah 2007). This articulation has also received support from 
legal academics. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 48, at 719 (approving the Altai test as “[a] better 
model”). 
56 982 F.2d 693, 706–12 (2d Cir. 1992). 
57 Although the filtration step is most explicitly articulated in the Second Circuit test, the Ninth 
Circuit’s extrinsic–intrinsic test, see discussion supra note 49, contemplates the concept of filtering out 
unprotectible aspects of the copyrighted work prior to comparing the works for substantial similarity. 
See Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 913 (9th Cir. 2010) (“At the initial extrinsic stage, 
we examine the similarities between the copyrighted and challenged works and then determine whether 
the similar elements are protectable or unprotectable. For example, ideas, scenes a faire (standard 
features) and unoriginal components aren’t protectable. When the unprotectable elements are filtered 
out, what’s left is an author’s particular expression of an idea, which most definitely is protectable.” 
(emphasis omitted) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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unprotectible elements has yielded protectible expression.58 To be clear, 
copyright can adhere to the compilation even of unprotectible elements 
because of the original way in which the components are arranged and 
selected.59 Just like a computer program whose ultimate expression is 
created by the “composite result of interacting subroutines,” an artwork too 
is an expression that is the composition of interacting visual units.60 This 
approach of combining a rigorous abstraction test with a check to ensure 
the protection of compilation—as discussed in Section I.C, a step that the 
total concept and feel test attempts to do—provides a model that could be 
applied to PGS works. 
Conducting the abstraction–filtration analysis is simple in theory. The 
test can be conceptualized as a ladder of abstraction ranging from the most 
concrete expression rung to the most abstract idea rung.61 The court starts 
by determining the lowest rung on which the two works share similarities. 
If this rung is high enough up on the abstraction ladder—an idea rung—no 
substantial similarity exists despite any overlap.62 If, however, the works 
share elements on a low enough, concrete enough rung—an expression 
rung—then the work might be substantially similar to (and thus might 
infringe) the plaintiff’s copyright.63 If the lowest rung with similarities is on 
an expression rung, all unprotectible elements—ideas, facts, or other 
expression in the public domain—are filtered out prior to comparing the 
two works for substantial similarity.64 
Determining precisely what to filter out, that is, how large to make the 
substantial similarity sieve openings, is difficult. Famously stated by Judge 
Learned Hand, the substantial similarity test, despite its importance, is 
“inevitably . . . ad hoc” because “no principle can be stated as to when an 
58 Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Sci. Commc’ns, Inc., 118 F.3d 955, 967 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding 
that it is a misapplication of the Altai test to filter out the “interrelationship among the design 
elements”). 
59 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 341 (1991) (“A compilation is not 
copyrightable per se, but is copyrightable only if its facts have been ‘selected, coordinated, or arranged 
in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.’”). 
60 Altai, 982 F.2d at 705. 
61 Jessica Litman illustrates well what Judge Learned Hand was doing at the top-most rung of the 
ladder: he “analyzed the works’ expression at . . . what he might have termed a higher level of 
abstraction, comparing descriptive summaries of the plot and characters of the play and the movie.” 
Jessica Litman, Silent Similarity, 14 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 11, 12 (2015). 
62 For example, if two works’ only shared similarity is the concept of a mystery novel, the court 
will say the similarities exist on an idea rung on the ladder of abstraction. 
63 If the shared similarities are specific aspects of the work, such as character details or the precise 
wording to express a character’s feelings, the two works would be compared on an expression rung. 
64 It is possible for expression to be in the public domain; such is the case, for example, if the 
copyright has expired. 
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imitator has gone beyond copying the ‘idea,’ and has borrowed its 
‘expression.’”65 As will be shown next, this problem is exacerbated in the 
context of PGS works. 
C. The Problem: Substantial Similarity Analysis in PGS Works
While the substantial similarity test perhaps is “of necessity vague,” it
is nevertheless somewhat “well settled” in the arena of literary works.66 The 
substantial similarity analysis developed in the context of literary works, 
and has therefore used “the written word as its model.”67 When used in 
other contexts, courts have approached the task as “fit[ting] everything else 
into the literary mode.”68 In comparing two literary works, the courts look 
to see “how closely . . . the second author tracked the first author’s 
particular language and structure of presentation . . . .”69 The test for visual 
works uses the same model but shows how closely the second artist tracked 
the first artist’s particular visual composition.70 
Applying a substantial similarity analysis test developed for literary 
works to PGS works, however, is particularly challenging because a visual 
work’s component parts are not easily distinguishable from the whole.71 In 
other words, a test designed for a “story” that has “a linear dimension” of a 
beginning, a middle, and an end is not easily adapted for PGS works that 
are “created to be perceived as an entirety.”72 Accordingly, the substantial 
similarity analysis of PGS works cannot be a straightforward, “strict visual 
comparison of the two items.”73  
Therefore, courts have somewhat modified the abstraction test to 
better fit PGS works. Recognizing the difficulty of isolating component 
65 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). 
66 Id. 
67 Tushnet, supra note 20, at 684. 
68 Id. 
69 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 583 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
70 See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, 274 F.2d at 489 (“No one disputes that the copyright extends 
beyond a photographic reproduction of the design, but one cannot say how far an imitator must depart 
from an undeviating reproduction to escape infringement. In deciding that question one should consider 
the uses for which the design is intended, especially the scrutiny that observers will give to it as used. In 
the case at bar we must try to estimate how far its overall appearance will determine its aesthetic appeal 
when the cloth is made into a garment.”). 
71 Id. (“[T]he same general color, and the arches, scrolls, rows of symbols, etc.” were deemed 
difficult to tell apart from “the design as a whole.”). 
72 Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that the substantial 
similarity “formulation” was developed “in the context of literary works” then “subsequent[ly] 
appli[ed] to graphic and three-dimensional works”). 
73 Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2001). 
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parts in visual works, the courts often use the more “discerning observer 
test,” which compares the “total concept and feel” of two visual works.74 
However, without a rigorous and reliable visual framework, copyright 
infringement cases for PGS works invariably suffer from one or both of the 
two problematic tendencies. The following Sections will introduce the 
problematic tendencies of relying on literal descriptions of visual works 
(literal descriptive approach), and using abstract visual units, such as 
colored shapes, in isolation (myopic visual approach). After laying out 
these problematic tendencies, this Note will address their root cause—a 
lack of a proper analytical unit in comparing visual works. 
1. The “Total Concept and Feel” Test for PGS Works.—The
abstraction test is careful in filtering out unprotectible ideas but might 
create a substantial similarity sieve with openings that are too big for visual 
works. The danger in this overzealous filtration is that, if taken too far, this 
step can potentially filter out a visual work in its entirety, nullifying its 
copyright protection.75 For example, any image can be separated into 
“composite parts” that are “little more than basic unprotectible elements 
like letters, colors and symbols.”76 Therefore, taking the abstraction test to 
“an extreme” may result in “almost nothing being copyrightable.”77 Indeed 
in the context of PGS works, courts tend to “paint with too broad a brush” 
when filtering out the component features in isolation.78 
In response to the danger of decomposing and filtering out entire 
visual works, the Ninth Circuit first developed,79 and the Second Circuit 
incorporated,80 the “total concept and feel test.”81 The test was initially 
designed for cases where the plaintiff’s work “incorporates elements from 
74 See discussion infra Section I.C.1. 
75 Visual works are especially vulnerable to the danger of filtering out all components. See 
Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]here can be no originality in a 
painting because all colors of paint have been used somewhere in the past.” (citation omitted)). 
76 Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001). 
77 Id. (noting also that this approach would then undermine the Feist approach to copyrightability 
of compiled wholes). 
78 William Patry cites one court as taking the abstraction test’s filtering to the extreme by looking at 
“stitching pattern” and “color combination” separately. PATRY, supra note 12, § 9:136.20. 
79 Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970), superseded by statute, 
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2012), as recognized in Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. 
IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010). 
80 Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Sci. Commc’ns, Inc., 118 F.3d 955, 967 (2d Cir. 1997). 
81 This alternate test should be distinguished from the Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic–intrinsic test, which 
is a variant of the “abstraction test.” Even when both the abstraction test and the total concept and feel 
test are employed in sequence, the Ninth Circuit’s test “bear[s] no resemblance” to the Second Circuit’s 
test. PATRY, supra note 12, § 9:235. 
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the public domain.”82 Because visual works are composites of abstract 
ideas, such as shapes, colors, and values, courts often opt to use this test for 
PGS works. In application, the total concept and feel test asks whether a 
more discerning observer would deem the similarity between two works 
attributable to “protected aesthetic expressions original to the allegedly 
infringed work,” rather than to ideas in the public domain.83 The test 
implicitly recognizes that a “work may be copyrightable even though it is 
entirely a compilation of unprotectible elements.”84 Indeed examining a 
work’s “total concept and feel” involves looking at “the original way in 
which the author has selected, coordinated, and arranged the elements of 
his or her work.”85 
For example, the Second Circuit in Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. 
eschewed the danger of potentially filtering out all of the plaintiff’s visual 
expression through the abstraction test’s “mechanical and counterintuitive 
. . . exercise” of reducing the image to “common stripes and colors” by 
using the total concept and feel test to compare sweater designs “as a 
whole.”86 After declining to “extract[] the unprotectible elements,” such as 
“common stripes and colors,” the court instead engaged in comparing only 
the works’ “distinctive elements.”87 The court looked at the works 
holistically before concluding that the compositions originated in “one 
creative source.”88 Likewise in a subsequent Second Circuit case, Hamil 
America Inc. v. GFI, the court again “compared the total concept and feel” 
of two fabric designs, focusing on how the visual components are 
“selected, coordinated and arranged.”89  
The total concept and feel test, therefore, may allow visual works’ 
whole composition—a compilation of otherwise unprotectible 
components—to receive copyright protection as a visual expression. In the 
context of PGS works, the total concept and feel test has been praised as “a 
82 Yurman Studio, Inc. v. Castaneda, 591 F. Supp. 2d 471, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Boisson, 
273 F.3d at 272). 
83 Id. (quoting Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 134–35 (2d 
Cir. 2003)). 
84 Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003–04 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. 
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)) (reaffirming that a compilation can demonstrate the
requisite creativity for copyright protection). 
85 Id.; see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 341 (“A compilation is not copyrightable per se, but is 
copyrightable only if its facts have been ‘selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the 
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.’” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2012))). 
86 Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1003. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1004–05. 
89 193 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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welcome check on a tendency of courts to lose the forest for the trees by 
balkanizing a unified copyrighted work into constituent elements.”90 
Therefore, since the protectible aspects of visual works are “their overall 
appearance,” the total concept and feel test is apt for the comparison of 
PGS works.91  
However, despite this doctrinally sound modern test, the application 
of the substantial similarity test for visual works has invariably resulted in 
two problematic tendencies: the courts use (1) the literal descriptive 
approach to filter and compare literal rather than visual descriptions, or (2) 
the myopic visual approach to filter and compare abstract visual units that 
are divorced from how human vision works. As will be demonstrated 
below, the literal descriptive approach leaves the filtration sieve openings 
too large (denying plaintiff lawful copyright protection) and the myopic 
visual approach leaves the filtration sieve openings arbitrary (detaching 
copyright protection from the underlying visual expression). At the 
foundation of these two current, problematic approaches is not a flawed 
doctrine but the unavailability of a reliable and precise visual language 
courts can use to apply the total concept and feel test to PGS works. 
2. The First Problematic Tendency: Literal Descriptive
Approach.—Courts have recognized that preserving the idea–
expression distinction requires customizing the analysis based on the 
category of the creative work.92 A copyright infringement test designed to 
analyze literary works, compare musical compositions, and measure PGS 
works would naturally be comprised of verbal units such as metaphors, 
musical concepts such as melody, and visual elements such as lines, 
respectively. However, courts deviate from this intuition when they collect 
literal descriptions of visual works’ objects and features, and compare them 
across images instead of comparing overlapping visual components.93 
Unfortunately, thinking in terms of literal descriptions corresponds to our 
cognitive, rather than perceptual, brain function.94 
90 PATRY, supra note 12, § 9:155. 
91 Id. § 9:162. 
92 See, e.g., Franklin Mint Corp. v. Wildlife Art Exchange, Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(“Isolating the idea from the expression and determining the extent of copying required for unlawful 
appropriation necessarily depend to some degree on whether the subject matter is words or symbols 
written on paper, or paint brushed onto canvas.”). 
93 See, e.g., Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 273 (2d Cir. 2001) (“cow”); Folio Impressions, 
Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 761 (2d Cir. 1991) (“rose”). 
94 See VICKI BRUCE ET AL., VISUAL PERCEPTION: PHYSIOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY AND ECOLOGY 268 
(4th ed. 2003). 
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This is problematic because object identification and visual perception 
are distinct brain tasks. Figure 1 illustrates this; before checking the title in 
this footnote,95 look at the image before reading on—what do you see? 
Seeing abstract black shapes on a white background (visual experience) is 
separate from seeing the birds (cognitive interpretation). When we convert 
an image to a descriptive, literal list of identifiable objects, we rely on 
prototypes in our brain to understand the image rather than engaging in a 
perceptual experience.96 Because the repertoire of visual prototypes is 
idiosyncratic, prototypes cannot be the basis for an objective test.97  
FIGURE 1: PROTOTYPE VS. PERCEPTION 
Another perhaps more important problem for copyright policy is that a 
literal descriptive approach does not correspond to a meaningful protection 
95 The title of this image is “penguins in love,” created using a photo by Paz Arando. Paz Arando, 
UNSPLASH (Sept. 5, 2016) https://unsplash.com/@pazarando?photo=7hy971VUte0 [https://perma.cc/
8TMT-NSTA]. For a classic image illustrating how objection identification can modify the visual 
experience, see the 1966 photograph by Ronald C. James, featured in Alexis C. Madrigal, Things You 
Cannot Unsee (and What They Say About Your Brain), ATLANTIC (May 5, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/05/10-things-you-cant-unsee-and-what-that-says-
about-your-brain/361335/ [https://perma.cc/Y6YX-6MYA]. 
96 Prototypes are formed by a composite of particulars. For example, a prototype dog is a generic 
image that, instead of corresponding to a particular dog previously seen, is an average epitome of the 
idea of all dogs previously encountered. MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, RICHARD B. IVRY & GEORGE R. 
MANGUN, COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND 434–35 (2d ed. 2002). 
97 I will not discuss the subjectivity aspect of using literal descriptions in substantial similarity 
analysis beyond this point because this involves another perennial issue in intellectual property, the 
problem of audience. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual 
Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251 (2014) (discussing the inconsistency across intellectual 
property infringement suit standards in patent, copyright, and trademark law as to whether the works are 
judged from the expert, the consumer, or the ordinary person’s point of view). 
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of visual expression, especially for representational art. In dissecting a 
work of representational art, the identifiable objects—patently perceived—
tempt the courts to compare the presence or the absence of those 
representations rather than engage in a visual analysis.98 This approach 
envisions a substantial similarity sieve with openings that are too large. 
With this standard, we might filter out artist’s aesthetic decisions, the 
choices that deserve copyright protection, by deeming them a mere 
representation of a set of named objects.99 We would then develop a 
copyright law where we pretend that Van Gogh’s swirly night sky painting 
is similar to Pissarro’s impressionistic and much more subdued night sky 
painting, simply because we can identify both as paintings of the night sky. 
Because copyright law protects creative expression rather than the subject 
matters of images, this is one tellingly absurd result of the literal, 
descriptive approach.  
A flip side of less protection for representational images is that, under 
the literal descriptive approach, abstract artworks that evade object labeling 
might receive greater copyright protection. For example, in upholding that 
the “rose” patterns were not substantially similar, the Second Circuit noted 
that “by the rose’s very nature one artist’s rendering of it will closely 
resemble another artist’s work.”100 From this one might infer that an 
abstract painting based on roses might cross over to idea at a relatively 
higher rung on the ladder of abstraction than a representational painting of 
roses. The Third Circuit has also recognized this literal descriptive 
approach’s absurd result: a “painter like Monet when dwelling upon 
impressions created by light on the facade of the Rouen Cathedral is apt to 
create a work which can make infringement attempts difficult” by the 
virtue of its abstract nature.101 In contrast, “an artist who produces a 
rendition with photograph-like clarity and accuracy may be hard pressed to 
prove unlawful copying by another who uses the same subject matter and 
the same technique.”102  
98 See, e.g., Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 827 (9th Cir. 2002) (“These significant 
elements are absent from the Cavaliers’ work. Thus, we do not find a triable issue of substantial 
similarity as to this illustration.”). 
99 Tushnet, supra note 20, at 687. 
100 Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991). 
101 Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat’l Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1978) (“[I]n the 
world of fine art, the ease with which a copyright may be delineated may be depend on the artist’s 
style.”). 
102 Id.; see also PATRY, supra note 12, § 9:167 (“The limitations imposed by standard treatment of 
a subject were also to be taken into account, since a ‘scientific drawing of a bird must necessarily be 
more similar to another of the same nature than it would be to an abstract version of the creature in 
flight.’”). 
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The science of visual perception can explain why representational 
paintings look more similar than abstract ones. Once humans identify an 
object, we tend to think there are only a few ways to visually represent it.103 
However, there is no legal justification for what results: artistic expression 
in abstract works devoid of identifiable objects may receive greater 
copyright protection than artistic expression in representational works. 
And yet, the literal descriptive approach is pervasive, even for courts 
that ostensibly use the total concept and feel test and are aware that the 
nature of visual works may call for a test distinct from one used for literary 
works.104 The Second Circuit, for example, in deciding Boisson v. Banian, 
Ltd., a copyright infringement case involving high-end alphabet quilts, 
ostensibly used the total concept and feel test and recognized that the 
arrangement of unprotected elements, such as the blocks of colors, can 
cohere into a copyrightable whole.105 Incredibly, immediately following the 
articulation of the total concept and feel standard, the court became mired 
in a highly feature-specific literal comparison, finding two of the 
defendant’s alphabet quilt to infringe the plaintiff’s based on such things as 
the similarity in the placement and the identity of specific, representational 
icons on a grid.106  
The reliance on a literal descriptive approach becomes patent when 
the court described the plaintiff’s quilt as an extensive and detailed list of 
identifiable features: the grid (“six horizontal rows, each row containing 
five blocks”), the letters and their placements, and the icons (“a cat, a 
house, a single-starred American flag and a basket”).107 Based on this literal 
descriptive comparison, defendant’s quilt was found to be substantially 
similar to the plaintiff’s quilt; the alphabets were similarly arranged, and 
the only differences between the icons were that “the picture of the cow 
jumping over the moon is somewhat altered, the bear is replaced by a teddy 
bear sitting up and wearing a vest that looks like a single-starred American 
flag, and the star in the last block is represented in a different color.”108  
In essence, the court’s conclusion on the substantial similarity 
comparison depended on whether there was a cat or a cow in a certain box 
in a grid, a wholly nonvisual distinction between the works. Similarly in 
103 See discussion infra Section II.A. 
104 Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003–04 (2d Cir. 1995). 
105 273 F.3d 262, 273 (2d Cir. 2001). For photos of the quilts at issue, see Copyright Basis, UNIV.
OF MICH. LIBRARY (Jan. 10, 2017), http://guides.lib.umich.edu/copyrightbasis/rights-of-copyright-
holders [https://perma.cc/4UJW-TJ5Y].  
106 Boisson, 273 F.3d at 373–74. 
107 Id. at 273–76. 
108 Id. at 273. 
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another Second Circuit case that employed a literal descriptive approach, 
liability for copyright infringement for PGS works rested on whether or not 
the allegedly infringing image “depict[ed] a boy wearing glasses.”109 
Essentially, despite articulating in theory the total concept and feel test that 
can visually analyze images, the courts in practice have been playing an 
elaborate game of “spot the difference” with answer keys provided by the 
litigants.110 
Courts may be well intentioned when they meticulously catalog and 
compare descriptive features. It makes some logical sense to believe that a 
more detailed approach is a more thorough one and that a more thorough 
test is a more precise one. The Ninth Circuit, for example, in a case 
involving illustrations in two children’s books, exemplifies a well-
intentioned reliance on details, one based on striving to modify a test 
designed for literary works to one for visual works.111 The Ninth Circuit 
stated that because “[t]he precise factors evaluated for literary works do not 
readily apply to art works,” it compared the illustrations by “look[ing] to 
the similarity of the objective details in appearance.”112 The court then went 
on to compare literal similarities such as the identifiable character features 
(“Ping-Pong ball-shaped eyes” and “bulbous nose”); actions (“dancing in a 
top hat,” “lounging,” and “yawning”); and subject matter (the night sky in 
which “a star [is] being polished”).113  
This literal descriptive approach, however, is ultimately incoherent. 
How can two images be found substantially similar because they contain a 
sufficient amount of the same identifiable stuff? By this logic, two visual 
images that contain fifty state birds may be found to be similar even if the 
two works are visually distinct. Surely copyright protection for visual 
expression cannot turn on literal comparison of features. 
3. The Second Problematic Tendency: Myopic Visual
Approach.—The second problematic tendency occurs when a
court uses seemingly visual concepts to compare works. They are 
seemingly visual because abstract visual units, such as a colored shape, are 
109 Scholastic Inc. v. Stouffer, 81 F. App’x 396, 398 (2d Cir. 2003). 
110 Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (relying on “the 
similarities and differences between [the] works” that “[t]he parties have catalogued at length and in 
depth” to do the substantial similarity analysis). 
111 Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2002). 
112 Id. (citation omitted). Of course the Ninth Circuit’s test deviates from the Second Circuit’s test. 
However, the “extrinsic test” is analogous to the filtration step in the Second Circuit’s test in that both 
require “a court [to] filter out and disregard the non-protectible elements in making its substantial 
similarity determination.” Id. at 822–23.  
113 Id. at 827. 
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not perceived in isolation as the courts using myopic visual approach 
presume.114 In other words, what is perceived as a red rectangle, for 
example, is seen as one because the surroundings make it so. Of course, 
what the factfinder sees already takes context into account. There are 
nonetheless three problems with using abstract visual units for substantial 
similarity analysis. First, abstract visual ideas, such as size, value, and color 
of shapes, have no corresponding perceptual analog and therefore would 
result in a test that could theoretically be reliable (if consistently applied) 
but not precise.  
The second and related problem is that the abstract visual units are 
ambiguous. For instance, a shape may be perceived larger than its actual 
size on paper for at least two reasons. An artist who knows how to create 
visual effects on the page may have placed the shape in such a way to 
imply convergence of visual rays—i.e., linear perspective—so the shape 
looks not smaller but far away. A shape may also be perceived larger than 
its actual size because it is surrounded by darker values. Therefore, by 
comparing abstract visual notions such as a shape of a certain size, it may 
be impossible to know whether two similar visual expressions were 
compared. 
Finally and most importantly, the third problem is that using abstract 
visual units may not result in meaningful copyright protection. On the one 
hand, not filtering abstract visual units creates the danger of giving overly 
broad monopoly protection in the form of a copyright to a single artist. The 
court may inadvertently award copyright for a mere artistic technique that 
reflects how the human eye sees, precluding others from using similar 
techniques to create a visual impression. If, on the other hand, the courts 
filter out these abstract visual units, they may also filter out combinations 
of visual elements—or how the artists have combined techniques to create 
a particular expression—by reducing images down to the most abstract 
components instead of looking at the expression as a whole. The courts 
therefore should not adopt abstract visual units in comparing PGS works. 
Unfortunately, the courts that have tried to use this myopic visual 
approach and have already run into a wall. This problematic tendency is 
prominently demonstrated again in Boisson v. Banian, where the court used 
unprotectible visual concepts such as a shape of a letter in its dissection of 
visual works.115 The Boisson court relied on the colors of the letters and the 
square blocks—abstract visual units—to make a substantial similarity 
114 See discussion infra Section II.A. 
115 273 F.3d 262, 273–76 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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determination for sets of quilts.116 Instead of analyzing the holistic 
arrangement of these abstract visual components, the court looked at each 
visual abstract unit in isolation.117 
The myopic visual approach erroneously relies on unprotectible 
elements to determine that an observer would “perceive [two works] as 
coming from one creative source.”118 The court in Knitwaves, Inc. v. 
Lollytogs Ltd. displayed both the linear descriptive and the myopic visual 
tendencies when it held that two sweater designs are substantially similar 
because they both feature “the same two fall symbols” and “virtually the 
same color scheme.”119 First of all, leaves and squirrels, used to depict fall, 
should have been filtered out as scenes a faire. The fact that they were not 
shows that the court employed a literal descriptive approach.120 The court 
also used a myopic visual approach. A color palette, not a protectible idea, 
was myopically considered in isolation to find that the works shared a 
substantial overlap.121 Part III explores how to move away from viewing 
visual units in isolation to perform a truly visual and rigorous total concept 
and feel test. 
* *  *
These cases demonstrate that courts simply do not know how to take a 
truly visual approach to substantial similarity analysis. The total concept 
and feel test is currently difficult to apply without a meaningful standard as 
to what creates a protectible compilation of visual components. Indeed, 
while trying to speak in visual language to protect “precisely the type of 
‘original selection’” that received copyright protection in theory, a 
factfinder is left without a precise standard or language to dissect a visual 
work.122 Lacking precise units that match visual reality, a court was left 
with vague concepts such as an “open, less busy aesthetic,” “motifs,” and 
“structural layout.”123 In another case, the substantial similarity analysis 
116 Id. 
117 See id. 
118 Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1004 (2d Cir. 1995). 
119 Id. 
120 See supra Section I.C.2.  
121 Id.; see Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also 
NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 61 (2008) (“Under the total-concept-and-feel and 
audience tests for substantial similarity, what might once have been considered the permissible, indeed 
laudable, reformulation of an unprotected ‘idea’ may now purportedly constitute infringing copying of 
‘expression.’”). 
122 Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir. 2003). 
123 Id. The court belies its lack of precise articulation of visual standard by reverting back to a 
territory it is familiar with—literary works—by analogizing the copying of an image to taking “the 
poem’s ‘feel.’” Id. at 137. 
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was done on the basis of whether an image looked “computer-generated” or 
“expensive [and] hand-made.”124  
Perhaps, as Rebecca Tushnet noted, the difficulty lies in the fact that 
“the artistic enterprise seems so opposed to the legal enterprise: 
irrationality versus rationality, subjectivity versus objectivity, fantasy (or 
Truth) versus facts, and so on.”125 The difficulty, to take her argument one 
step further, may not be the visual subject matter, but a lack of visual 
awareness. Part II starts to explore how a better understanding of human 
vision can help design a test that is rooted in the fundamentally contextual 
nature of visual perception.  
II. VISUAL PERCEPTION, VISUAL LANGUAGE, AND PERCEPTUAL FACTS
The current visual substantial similarity test is inconsistent with how
we see. Though the brain is the final frontier,126 a general consensus among 
neuroscientists has emerged over recent decades: human vision is 
contextual.127 From this idea, we can derive what this Note calls “perceptual 
facts.” These facts do not refer to true statements, but processes and 
techniques derived from the principles of visual perception. These 
perceptual facts are a set of techniques for creating PGS works that mimic 
the contextual nature of visual perception.128 Artists learn to manipulate 
perceptual facts to represent the three-dimensional world on a two-
dimensional surface and to create a particular visual impression. 
Perceptual facts can be used in designing a visual substantial 
similarity analysis. Copyright would protect the added layer of artistic 
expression rather than the perceptual facts—whether these were learned, 
part of custom and technique, or independently discovered. This Part 
explores the strong consensus that has emerged in the science of visual 
perception about the contextual nature of visual perception129 and how 
124 Odegard Inc. v. Safavieh Carpets, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 2d 275, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
125 Tushnet, supra note 20, at 693–94. 
126 See, e.g., Paul G. Allen & Francis S. Collins, Toward the Final Frontier: The Human Brain,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8, 2013), http://on.wsj.com/1MSP6ay [https://perma.cc/94B6-P2JW]. 
127 Some questions about visual perception are still unanswered but go beyond the scope of 
designing a visual substantial similarity analysis. They include questions like “how are context frames 
represented in the cortex?”—the cortex being the most sophisticated part of the brain that draws on 
cognitive schema in addition to retinal data—and “how do motivation and attention modulate 
contextual processing?” See Moshe Bar, Visual Objects in Context, 5 NATURE REVIEWS 
NEUROSCIENCE 617, 627 (2004). 
128 Cf. Pascal Wallisch, Why “Dressgate” Matters, PASCAL’S PENSEES (Feb. 28, 2015), 
http://pensees.pascallisch.net/?p=1901 [https://perma.cc/2KMJ-59Q6] (“It has been known for a long 
time that color vision is strongly susceptible to illumination and context.”).  
129 See discussion infra Section II.A. 
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artists learn to manipulate these principles using perceptual facts.130 These 
insights set the stage for Part III, which proposes a new test that first filters 
out perceptual facts in a newly designed substantial similarity analysis 
sieve suitable for comparing PGS works.131 
A. Visual Perception and the Credibility of “Perceptual Facts”
A picture is a fact. 
—Ludwig Wittgenstein132 
Vision initiates when light strikes the eye’s retina.133 An eye is not 
simply a camera that captures an image.134 The retina collects the 
information contained in the light, translates it into electrical signals, then 
transmits those signals along a neural visual pathway.135 All visual 
perception experiments attempt to answer a seemingly impossible puzzle: 
how does the brain project the three-dimensional world onto the two-
dimensional retina, then “reconstruct the objects and the surfaces that we 
‘see’” in the mind’s eye?136 
 Of particular importance to designing a scientifically based, truly 
visual substantial similarity test for PGS works is the problem of “stimulus 
equivalence,” also known as “object constancy.” This problem results from 
the fact that there are infinite variations of visual stimuli, each composed of 
a pattern of wavelengths of light that could represent a single object.137 To 
illustrate, think about your best friend’s face. The way that a friend’s face is 
projected onto your retina may vary according to multiple factors such as 
130 See discussion infra Section II.B. 
131 See infra Part III. 
132 Tushnet, supra note 20, at 693 (citing LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-
PHILOSOPHICUS ¶ 2.141 (D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness trans., Humanities Press 1974) (1921)).
133 The brain is in “complete darkness” inside the skull. Pascal Wallisch, Lessons from the Dress: 
Vision Is Fundamentally Ambiguous—But Usually Not This Ambiguous, SLATE (Feb. 27, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2015/02/what_color_is_this_dress_a_scientis
t_explains_visual_ambiguity_and_color.html [https://perma.cc/2UZA-9CUM]. Therefore, “the brain 
relies on the eyes to supply an image of the outside world, but there are many processing steps between 
the translation of light energy into electrical impulses that happens in the eye and the neural activity that 
corresponds to a conscious perception for the outside world.” Id. 
134 See GOMBRICH, supra note 8, at 298 (“[T]he retina itself . . . does not react to individual stimuli 
of light . . . but to their relationship, or gradients.”). 
135 Burke Frank, Vision Quest: Psychologist Steven Shevell Breaks Down How the Brain Processes 
What the Eye Sees, U. CHI. MAG. (2010), http://magazine.uchicago.edu/1012/investigations/vision-
quest.shtml [https://perma.cc/A98F-QRQL] (“What we perceive as properties essential to whole 
objects . . . are actually processed by separate pathways of the brain.”). 
136 Leif H. Finkel & Paul Sajda, Constructing Visual Perception, 82 AM. SCIENTIST 224, 224 
(1994). 
137 BRUCE ET AL., supra note 94, at 265–66. 
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“lighting conditions and their distance, angle, and facial expression.”138 
Despite the infinite number of possible representations of a friend’s face, 
we do not see them as infinitely different people—we identify our friend’s 
face despite the myriad visual stimuli. This is why recognition, seeing one 
of infinite variations, is not equivalent to object identification; the former is 
a perceptual event whereas the latter is a cognitive interpretation. 
Although facial and object recognition starts with visual perception 
when the light hits the retina, a cognitive process creates the ultimate result. 
We learn to identify objects and faces through a process of learning not 
seeing.139 From infancy, we develop extensive catalogues of “internal 
representation” that we can use for “template matching,” the cognitive 
process involved in object or facial identification.140 Simply put, for each 
letter, object, or face we see, the brain compares it to a set of templates, a 
library of prototypes in the brain’s long-term memory, to find the best fit.141  
This scientific fact recommends against the literal descriptive 
approach courts have relied on as a visual substantial similarity test 
identified and discussed in Section I.C.2.142 This is so because if we base 
comparisons of visual works on object identification, we are relying on 
cognitive schemas that reduce infinite visual expressions to a prototype. 
This aspect of object identification shows that the literal descriptive 
tendency captures cognitive in addition to perceptual processing in the 
brain, and is therefore not a truly visual substantial similarity test.  
The consensus that has emerged in visual perception research rejects 
not only the literal descriptive approach but also the myopic visual 
approach. Broadly categorized, there are two insights from the study of 
visual perception, summarized as follows, that are important to deriving 
and using perceptual facts to create a visual substantial similarity test for 
PGS works. First, vision is holistic. This fact affirms the total concept and 
feel test, seeking to protect visual composition as expression. Second, 
vision is contextual. Because visual perception is contextual, an abstract 
visual notion such as a band of color in isolation cannot be a perceptual 
fact. This allows us to design a unit of analysis for rigorous visual 
substantial similarity analysis—i.e., perceptual facts. These perceptual facts 
rectify the well-intentioned but erroneous myopic visual approach 
identified and discussed in Section I.C.3.143  
138 Id. at 265. 
139 Id. at 268. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 See supra Section I.C.2. 
143 See supra Section I.C.3. 
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When we identify an object, we do not first see the features, and then 
add them up to form the object. Rather, we initially see the whole. Gestalt 
theory has demonstrated this perceptual fact.144 Gestalt psychologists 
revolutionized visual thinking with an idea of vision that undermined the 
prevailing notion of vision as “proceeding from the particular to the 
general” and showed that seeing occurs at the “overall structural features” 
first, then the details.145 This holistic vision is also highly contextual. The 
parts of the visual field, the visual elements, influence the experience— 
suggesting strongly that the arrangement of abstract details alters the visual 
experience. In other words, even though we see the whole, context 
influences how the details are seen.146  
Object recognition is done primarily through the initial, holistic 
delineation of the object.147 Recent studies show that object identification is 
contextual. Our cumulative visual experience cues our rapid recognition of 
the object in context.148 In fact, visualizing an object in isolation is 
difficult.149 Context clues function as “glue that binds objects in coherent 
scenes.”150 And even when we focus on features, even simple features like a 
line are not seen in isolation but in context.151  
This is why the myopic visual approach to substantial similarity is 
nonsensical. We do not see absolute value or color—vision occurs by 
perceiving contrasts in color, value, or mass. Ultimately, what is perceived 
may not reflect physical reality.152 This phenomenon makes sense when we 
recall that the visual system is primarily for survival, not aesthetic 
enjoyment.153 For example, color vision is useful to distinguish ripe fruit, 
144 And many of these descriptive rules have been empirically tested and for the most part 
confirmed. See BRUCE ET AL., supra note 94, at 134, 138. 
145 RUDOLF ARNHEIM, ART AND VISUAL PERCEPTION: A PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CREATIVE EYE 45 
(2004). 
146 Id. 
147 Michelle R. Greene & Aude Oliva, Recognition of Natural Scenes from Global Properties: 
Seeing the Forest Without Representing the Trees, 58 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 137, 138 (2009) (“[T]he 
initial scene representation can be based on . . . global properties, and not necessarily the objects it 
contains.”). 
148 Bar, supra note 127, at 617 (noting that contextual cues are “predictable properties” that 
“facilitate perception, and in particular object recognition”). 
149 Id. (“It is hard to imagine seeing any [object] without a background and other objects.”). 
150 Id. 
151 Amanda Williams & Naomi Weisstein, Line Segments Are Perceived Better in a Coherent 
Context Than Alone: An Object-Line Effect in Visual Perception, 6 MEMORY & COGNITION 85, 85 
(1978) (“[S]imple features are not detected independently of the context that they are in . . . .”). 
152 Frank, supra note 135. 
153 See MARGARET LIVINGSTONE, VISION AND ART: THE BIOLOGY OF SEEING 24 (2014). If you 
think vision is no longer used for survival because we do not live in nature, think again. Much of our 
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which has a warm color, from the green foliage. Value (degree of 
luminescence), on the other hand, is useful for depth perception and form 
as we navigate the physical world.154 Therefore, what the eye registers and 
the brain processes is not an absolute point on a light–dark scale or a hue 
on a color wheel. Instead, information processing is triggered by contrast.155 
Visual information is contained in the relationships between the patterns 
that ultimately come to a coherent image.156  
The physiological basis for this relational nature of visual processing 
was found in primary visual cells—ganglion cells—which scientist Stephen 
Kuffler found to be activated by the presence of light placed acutely on a 
corresponding retinal area on the back of the eye.157 However, if the light is 
shown on an adjacent retinal area, these particular cells are inhibited.158 
Kuffler termed this idea “center/surround organization.”159 
The center/surround organization is pervasive throughout the visual 
system. Contrast detection permeates the visual pathway since “neurons 
respond best to abrupt changes, rather than to gradual shifts in luminance,” 
and “ignore gradual changes in light and the overall level of the illuminant, 
which are usually not biologically important.”160 Additionally, “[i]t is more 
efficient to encode only those parts of the image where there are changes or 
discontinuities than to encode the light level at every point in the entire 
image.”161 In other words, the brain has evolved to expend energy on 
detecting degrees of contrasts. Artists construct pictures using this visual 
principle.162 For example, the artist can create the effect of a hue and value 
visual processing power is in fact devoted to avoiding bumping into hard, spiky, or hot objects that 
would cause injury. 
154 See id. at 31, 42. 
155 Morgane M. Roth et al., Thalamic Nuclei Convey Diverse Contextual Information to Layer 1 of 
Visual Cortex, 19 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 299, 299 (2016) (“[P]erception is . . . highly dependent on 
the context in which a given stimulus occurs, such as the sensory surround . . . .”). 
156 BRUCE ET AL., supra note 94, at 86. 
157 See LIVINGSTONE, supra note 153, at 49; see also BRUCE ET AL., supra note 94, at 85 (noting 
that the goal of initial visual processing is to “specify[] where the most significant changes occur in the 
intensity and spectral composition of light”). 
158 See LIVINGSTONE, supra note 153, at 49. 
159 Id. at 52. 
160 See id. at 50. 
161 See id. at 50–51. 
162 Id. at 52, 54 (“Many visual perceptions, such as luminance, color, motion, and depth, exhibit 
greater sensitivity to abrupt than to gradual change, and in each modality this selectivity is due to an 
underlying center/surround organization. . . . [A]rtists have learned to take advantage of the fact that our 
visual systems are selectively sensitive to discontinuities . . . .”). 
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by placing an adjacent contrasting color or tone.163 Throughout an entire 
picture, the artist can vary degree of detail and blur so that in contrast the 
picture is more realistic and dynamic.164 The composition of a picture 
depends largely on the artist’s masterful use of contrasts, ultimately derived 
from brain physiology. 
Drawing from the theme that visual perception is contextual and the 
observations of how contrast can be manipulated by artists, we can start to 
list perceptual facts. A juxtaposition of two colors, for example, is a 
perceptual fact since color, like all visual factors, is perceived 
relationally.165 In the brain, a color is defined only at the “color-change 
contour.”166 An object, like a tomato, however, “looks red not only at the 
edges . . . but also in the center” because “the lack of activity in the center 
is interpreted as meaning that nothing has changed since the edge” and the 
brain accordingly assumes the field is red.167 The brain does not see 
“absolute hues” but tries to guess at the color of an object in varying visual 
conditions.168 Therefore, the second problematic tendency of using abstract 
colors as filterable components should be modified. Instead of filtering out 
patches of color as unprotected as the Boisson court did in performing a 
substantial similarity analysis, the courts should instead use a perceptual 
fact of color-change contour as the unit of filtration. 
Gestalt theory has also uncovered certain contextual visual tendencies 
that hint at perceptual facts. They are, not surprisingly, contextual in nature, 
showing that the abstract elements of line, shapes, and color interact with 
one another using five principles. First, visual elements can create a sense 
of separateness.169 Second, two components that share an abstract feature, 
in contrast to another feature nearby that lacks the shared characteristic, can 
create a feeling of similarity among the components that share a feature.170 
Third, elements that are in closer proximity can seem like they belong 
together.171 Fourth, subtle suggestion of enclosure can create a sense of a 
163 For example, participants report seeing a “horizontal yellow line” even though the line was 
green when it was horizontal because of disparate neural pathways of different speeds in perceiving 
orientation and color. See Frank, supra note 135. 
164 In contrast, “[t]he highly detailed, action-packed The Rape of the Sabine Women . . . seems 
relatively static, because you can see many details” all over the painting. LIVINGSTONE, supra note 153, 
at 87. 
165 Id. at 70. 
166 Id. at 72. 
167 Id. at 99. 
168 Wallisch, supra note 133. In fact, this makes us “bad at estimating absolute hue of objects.” Id. 
169 Richard Zakia, Photography and Visual Perception, 27 J. AESTHETIC EDUC. 67, 71 (1993). 
170 Id.; see Finkel & Sajda, supra note 136, at 226–27. 
171 Zakia, supra note 169, at 71; see Finkel & Sajda, supra note 136, at 226–27. 
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closed shape.172 Finally, certain overlapping features will seem continuous, 
and other overlapping features will seem disjointed and cut off.173 
Therefore, even unprotectible abstract components, depending on their 
movement across the composition, can alter the visual experience. A 
collection of these perceptual facts rather than abstract visual concepts 
should be the building-block units used to analyze visual works, just as 
words form the unit for creating meaning and expression in literary works. 
* *  *
From science, we can derive perceptual facts. Should we, however, 
trust the veracity of ever-evolving science? Given the elusive nature of 
substantial similarity, another scholar Kate Klonick has suggested taking 
lessons from cognitive psychology in designing a more objective 
substantial similarity test.174 Rebecca Tushnet rightly cautions against the 
“limits of science.”175 In so doing, she notes two problems: first, 
experimental data “may not reflect real-world experience,” and, second, 
science may not necessarily align with legal aims.176 The first concern is 
valid, especially in an area like neuroscience that continues to rapidly 
evolve. There are nonetheless certain principles in the science of visual 
perception that enjoy decades of accumulated consensus. For example, 
thirty years of research has resulted in consensus that “contextual 
knowledge facilitates object recognition.”177 And we have known for “at 
least 150 years” that the brain does not see visual components in isolation 
but guesses at them by harvesting retinal information.178 Relying on these 
well-settled aspects of science allows us to draw from human wisdom, 
rather than build on sand. The next and final Part of this Note addresses the 
second concern. 
In summary, themes in the science of visual perception demonstrate 
perceptual facts. Perceptual facts’ greatest contribution would be to provide 
172 Zakia, supra note 169, at 71. 
173 Id. 
174 Kate Klonick, Comparing Apples to Applejacks: Cognitive Science Concepts of Similarity 
Judgment and Derivative Works, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 365, 385 (2013). Ms. Klonick 
advocates applying insight from cognitive psychology to design a better substantial similarity test, with 
respect to understanding the subjective nature of judging similarity. 
175 Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX.
L. REV. 507, 508 (2008).
176 Id.
177 Bar, supra note 127, at 617; see Aude Oliva & Antonio Torralba, The Role of Context in Object
Recognition, 11 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 520, 520 (“There is a general consensus that objects 
appearing in a consistent or familiar background are detected more accurately and processed more 
quickly than objects appearing in an inconsistent scene.”). 
178 Wallisch, supra note 133. 
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a scientifically sound, visually based skeletal framework that the courts can 
use to describe visual works for substantial similarity comparisons. Instead 
of talking about literal descriptions of an image or applying absolute terms 
to visual components we do not actually see, factfinders could describe 
images using perceptual facts and compare how these facts were used by 
artists.  
It is sometimes hard, however, to distinguish between perceptual facts 
and the expression of the artist. For example, an image that gives the 
illusion of depth may look magical in the way the three-dimensional world 
is mirrored on a two-dimensional surface. However, such illusions may 
nonetheless have an objective factual basis upon which a linear perspective 
is formed, rooted in the fact that light travels in a straight line. In other 
words, “some artistic techniques are based, not on the physical reality of 
these cues, but on the way the brain handles this information.”179 These 
techniques therefore manifest perceptual facts. For example, the two 
different approaches discussed in Part I as to how an artist can cause a 
shape to look smaller demonstrate the idea of convergence in linear 
perspective and irradiating light shapes in juxtaposed contrasting values. 
How artists use perceptual facts as tools of their trade will be explored in 
the next Section. 
B. Visual Language and the Artists Who Manipulate “Perceptual Facts”
Artists learn perceptual facts and use them as building blocks in
creating art; perceptual facts are expressed through visual language in 
artistic works. Simply put, artists are masters of illusion, tricking us into 
thinking we see objective reality beyond a flat piece of paper. Visual 
language is a composite language. For example, there is a visual language 
involving lines contrasted with shapes.180 Lines can denote variations in 
value, form, or perspective. Varying sizes of shapes can show proportional 
relationships. These shapes can be filled in with a tone using three 
variables: hue, value, and chroma.181 The hue is the identifiable color such 
as red or blue. The chroma, or intensity, describes the degree of saturation 
or strength of the hue. Finally, the value variable places the shape on a 
179 This exact quotation is available in MARGARET LIVINGSTONE, VISION AND ART: THE BIOLOGY
OF SEEING 101 (2002). The author describes the same idea in the updated 2014 version of her book. See 
LIVINGSTONE, supra note 153, at 176. 
180 The opposing forces in art include “straight lines and curves, light and dark, warm and cold 
colour.” HAROLD SPEED, THE PRACTICE & SCIENCE OF DRAWING 219 (4th ed. 1922). 
181 This is the system of colors developed by A.H. Munsell and widely used by artists although it is 
not the only way to classify color. See generally A.H. MUNSELL, A COLOR NOTATION (2012) 
(articulating the hue–value–chroma color classification on the Munsell sphere). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
862 
light–dark spectrum.182 Changing any one variable affects the other two.183 
And the relationship between any given component line, shape, or its 
placement on the picture affects the overall composition.184 Although it 
might take great deal of effort to grasp these visual concepts and to 
skillfully manipulate them, these techniques that ultimately mirror 
perceptual facts should not be a part of the artist’s copyrighted expression. 
If that were the case, it would be like compensating authors not for the 
particular combination of words, but for the concept of alliteration and 
rhyme. 
Ultimately, the protectible artistic expression sums up to a 
composition or a combination of perceptual facts to create a holistic visual 
impression. Composition can be seen as what holds disparate visual 
languages together, or more poetically put: “Composition is the mortar of 
the wall, as drawing and color are its rocks of defence. Without it the 
stones are of little value, and are but separate integrals having no unity.”185 
Artists should be skilled in multiple visual languages described in the 
above paragraph when composing a picture. This end goal of coherent 
composition can be defined as 
a system of design . . . . In composing a drawing, we manipulate the 
fundamental graphic elements of line, shape, and tone into figure-ground 
patterns that are coherent and which convey visual information. Through the 
organization and relationship of these elements, we define both the content 
and the context of [an artwork].186 
Composition contains both the idiosyncratic expression of the artist 
and the manifestation of fundamental visual concepts, as demonstrated by 
Figure 2 below.187 For example, an artist can use lines on a page to 
182 SPEED, supra note 180, at 121–22. 
183 Id. at 127 (There is a “power possessed by lines, tones, and colours, by their ordering and 
arrangement, to affect us, somewhat as different notes and combinations of sound do in music.”). 
184 See id. 
185 HENRY RANKIN POORE, PICTORIAL COMPOSITION AND THE CRITICAL JUDGMENT OF PICTURES
18–19 (1903). 
186 FRANCIS D.K. CHING WITH STEVEN P. JUROSZEK, DESIGN DRAWING 341 (2d ed. 2010). 
 187 The figure drawings are composed of overlapping visual languages. The schematic on the far 
left plots the tonal relationships of the major masses in the figure drawing. This map of the relative 
tonal values is composed of various perceptual facts from extreme tonal contrast on the top left (white 
of the paper adjacent to the darkest shade of the medium) to the juxtaposition of shapes in similar 
shades of tone on the lower right (the shadow of the right leg adjacent to the similar gray of the 
background). The two schematics on the far right isolate other visual languages and their corresponding 
perceptual facts such as shapes, linear perspective, and skeletal-muscular anatomy. The artist has 
weaved together myriad perceptual facts through an infinite number of decisions to arrive at the final 
compositions for the two figure drawings. Note that these drawings have been created to teach art 
students; composing a finished drawing by the artist would also normally involve other myriad and 
complex decisions such as where to place and scale the figure on a page. Michael Grimaldi, Life 
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represent a contour.188 Whether or not this line defines a contour where “the 
surface of the face turns sharply away from the lighting direction” or 
“where there is a sharp contrast such as at the hairline,” the artist is 
representing a perceptual fact about how edges and contours are detected 
and processed visually.189 An artist, therefore, is “compelled to become 
scientific because they have embraced a profession which includes 
science.”190 
FIGURE 2: BUILDING VISUAL COMPOSITION WITH PERCEPTUAL FACTS 
The ability to manipulate perceptual facts to compose an image is not 
innate but learned.191 Formal art training is learning to see (acquiring ability 
to see perceptual facts) and then learning to manipulate perceptual facts. 
Traditionally, in the days of old masters, young artists trained in “ateliers” 
where they worked as apprentices while acquiring the requisite artistic 
skills by imitating their teachers.192 Artistic training looks different now, 
done more commonly through degree programs than in apprenticeships, but 
Drawing Demonstration Drawings (on file with artist), reproduced with permission of the copyright 
owner.  
188 See LIVINGSTONE, supra note 153, at 54. 
189 BRUCE ET AL., supra note 94, at 104. 
190 POORE, supra note 185, at 15. 
191 See LIVINGSTONE, supra note 153, at 149. 
192 ALEXANDER LINDEY, PLAGIARISM AND ORIGINALITY 169 (1952). 
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nonetheless still requires learning to see and to express visual concepts 
relationally.193 
Visual processing occurs rapidly, and we are not good at seeing 
distinct visual elements separately. Therefore, artistic training is essentially 
learning to see. For example, to “shad[e] effectively, artists . . . must learn 
to evaluate luminance independent of color,” a very difficult task when “it 
is impossible to consciously see only the luminance version of a scene or 
painting.”194 To aid the acquisition of artistic competence, some artists 
intentionally try to understand visual perception principles, i.e., perceptual 
facts, so that they can manipulate them for desired effect.195 
Once a novice artist can see, the artist must then learn to express 
visual relationships. There are practical constraints to mimicking what they 
see. For example, currently available pigments form a limited range that 
will not allow one-to-one mapping of real-world luminance onto a 
canvas.196 Consequently, artists must use the tools they have—including 
their understanding of perceptual facts—to create the type of illusions that 
triggers an experience of luminescence. A “skilled” artist can use an 
“identical mix of paint[]” in a different context to create the illusion of 
“very different colors.”197 Although the adept application of this and other 
artistic techniques commands praise, it is also important to remember that a 
process based on perceptual facts falls outside copyright protection, as all 
facts do. The courts often conflate artistic process and expression.198 A 
better understanding of the artistic process would keep us from erroneously 
protecting the process rather than the resulting expression. 
III. A VISUAL APPROACH TO SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY ANALYSIS
As explained in Part II, the science of visual perception implies
perceptual facts, the techniques artists can use to create illusions in 
accordance with the way we see. In other words, science can help 
determine the boundary between unprotectible perceptual facts and 
protectible expression by inviting us to filter out aspects of the image that 
193 Artists who try to represent visual experiences on a two-dimensional surface must learn to “not 
trust[] their . . . eyes.” Ingrid Wickelgren, An Artist Reveals How He Tricks the Eyes, SCI. AM. (Dec. 13, 
2011), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/streams-of-consciousness/an-artist-reveals-how-he-tricks-
the-eyes/ [https://perma.cc/9YLY-ZUGT]. 
194 LIVINGSTONE, supra note 153, at 149. 
195 Wickelgren, supra note 193. 
196 LIVINGSTONE, supra note 153, at 150. 
197 Wickelgren, supra note 193. 
198 See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1992) (suggesting that factors such as 
“years of artistic development,” selection of “light” and “location,” and other “creative judgments 
concerning technical matters” are protectible expression). 
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reflect visual processing.199 We filter out perceptual facts because 
techniques involved in crafting a creative expression, whether it be stock 
characters in literature or artistic techniques derived from visual perception 
principles, do not themselves receive copyright protection.200 Techniques 
are facts that lie squarely in the idea side of the idea–expression divide and 
should be recognized as such. Putting perceptual facts on the idea side 
while placing the combination of perceptual facts on the protectible 
expression side results in a truly visual substantial similarity analysis that 
provides the courts with a rigorous framework for ensuring both 
appropriate filtration of ideas and meaningful protection of expression. In 
this visual substantial similarity test for PGS works, the filtration step 
would involve removing perceptual facts or the artistic techniques used to 
express a visual unit, and the comparison step would involve comparing the 
two works’ use of the perceptual facts in creating a total concept and feel of 
aesthetically creative statements. 
A. The Problem Revisited: Are the Courts Ready for a Visual Solution?
To review, courts tend to rely on the following two problematic
tendencies: (1) the literal descriptive approach and (2) the myopic visual 
approach, which are both inconsistent from the way we see. These 
problematic tendencies undermine the goal of the total concept and feel 
test.201 
Legal academics have suggested nonvisual solutions, but 
unfortunately none have been entirely satisfying. For example, Jeanne 
Fromer’s scheme involves carefully translating visual works into verbal 
description.202 This added step, however, does not eliminate the danger of 
extending copyright to subject matters rather than to visual expression, i.e., 
literal, descriptive approach. Rebecca Tushnet, even hinted at abandoning 
altogether, for visual works, the substantial similarity test, which she 
laments “makes impossible and self-contradictory demands on 
factfinders.”203 Her proposal implies that only instances of near-exact 
copying merit infringement liability for infringing visual work’s 
199 Lemley, supra note 48, at 741 (“The line between idea and expression, and the corresponding 
lines separating facts, functional elements, and the like from copyrightable expression, are 
extraordinarily difficult lines to draw.”). 
200 Cf. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930) (holding the 
similarities between the defendant’s and the plaintiff’s plot at the level of “stock figures” were 
necessary “stage properties” in a given genre such that the similarity could not be deemed infringement 
of protectible expression). 
201 See supra Section I.C.1. 
202 Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 781–94 (2009). 
203 Tushnet, supra note 20, at 687–88. 
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reproduction right.204 The problem with this proposal, however, is that 
liability might adhere for exact copying with probative similarity of 
possibly unprotectible expression while the copying of visual expression 
might be permitted as long as methods differ. This seems, unfortunately, to 
undermine the goal of granting copyright to creative visual expressions.  
Although both the Second and Ninth Circuits fall short of coming up 
with meaningful visual filters for the abstraction step of the substantial 
similarity analysis, recent cases demonstrate that the courts are willing to 
employ a distinctly visual analysis for PGS works. For example, the latest 
articulation of the PGS substantial similarity test in the Second Circuit is 
indeed doctrinally sound despite ultimately misapplying the total concept 
and feel test.205 In Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures v. Einstein Moomjy, 
Inc., Judge Calabresi recognized the importance of filtering out “elemental 
raw materials” for creative expression.206 Additionally, he stated that 
liability attaches only when the defendant has “parrot[ed] properties” that 
are a part of the “numerous aesthetic decisions embodied in the plaintiff’s 
work of art.”207 Indeed, this attempt to protect the aesthetic whole has 
animated the Second Circuit’s total concept and feel test.208  
The problem has not been the total concept and feel test as 
conceptualized, but the application of this test to particular works. Judge 
Calabresi correctly stated that “infringement analysis is not simply a matter 
of ascertaining similarity between components viewed in isolation,” but he 
ultimately lacked a clear framework for conducting a holistic visual 
analysis.209 He ended up resorting to doing precisely what he said he would 
not do: listing abstract components, such as “colors” and “the catalogue of 
standard geometric forms,” in isolation as a basis for comparing allegedly 
infringing and allegedly infringed works.210  
The Ninth Circuit also shows signs of an inchoate visual test. 
Although the court ultimately used a feature-centric, literal comparison of 
illustrations in children’s books, the court correctly articulated that artistic 
decisions such as the “arrangement of the representation[] may be 
considered in determining objective similarity in appearance” of visual 
204 Id. at 739 (noting that any works that are “not exact copies . . . would not be subject to the 
reproduction right” and probably fall outside copyright law).  
205 Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2003). 
206 Id. at 132 (internal quotation marks omitted). Some examples of elemental raw materials are 
“colors, letters, descriptive facts, and the catalogue of standard geometric forms.” Id. 
207 Id. at 134. 
208 Id. at 132–33. 
209 Id. at 132. 
210 Id. at 132, 134. 
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works.211 However, the court seemed overwhelmed at the prospect of 
crafting a list of visual components to consider; they lacked the perceptual 
facts as the proper visual unit of analysis.212 The court tried to use visual 
concepts such as shape (“five-pointed” star) and color (“yellowish”) for 
comparison.213 Although the attempt is admirable, these abstract visual 
components should not be used as analytical comparison units: a shape or 
color in isolation is not protectible expression. Without a clear analytical 
framework for comparing visual works, the court resorted to a literal 
descriptive comparison.214 
B. A Visual Solution to Substantial Similarity Analysis: Perceptual Facts
as Analytical Unit for Filtering and Comparison 
This Note proposes construing creative images not as a compilation of 
identifiable visual objects or abstract visual concepts, but as a compilation 
of perceptual facts. This new visual framework for substantial similarity 
analysis of PGS works involves (1) filtering out perceptual facts or the 
techniques artists use to manipulate them and (2) comparing visual works 
in terms of how perceptual facts are combined to holistically create an 
aesthetic, visual composition. 
The second step involves seeing how a nexus of perceptual facts, as 
used and manifested on the pictorial plane, culminates in a holistic visual 
composition. Although this is a novel approach for PGS works, it is 
arguably how the courts are already analyzing literary plots. For example, 
the courts have recognized and defined protectible literary expression as 
the “concrete elements that make up the total sequence of events and the 
relationships between major characters.”215 Similarly, it is entirely plausible 
then to see protectible visual expression as the concrete elements, i.e., 
perceptual facts, that make up the total visual composition of lines and 
shapes and the relationship between value, hue, and chroma. Just as in the 
literary context, an author may “string[] a significant number of 
unprotectible elements” into a protectible expression, a visual artist should 
be allowed to weave together a number of unprotectible perceptual facts 
into a protectible artwork.216 Equipped with a truly visual and discernable 
211 Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2002). 
212 Id. (noting that the court will “not attempt here to provide an exhaustive list of relevant factors 
for evaluating art work”). 
213 Id. at 823, 827. However, this list is mixed with other feature-oriented literal descriptions (e.g., 
that the stars are “smiling”). Id. 
214 See supra Section I.C.2.
215 Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
216 Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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unit of analysis—perceptual facts—the courts should cast aside the current, 
erroneous literal descriptive and myopic visual tendencies, and embrace a 
truly meaningful visual test. 
FIGURE 3: PERCEPTUAL FACTS 
 
To summarize the proposed visual substantial similarity test, 
perceptual facts are first filtered out, and how they are combined to form a 
visual composition is then compared for substantial similarity between the 
visual works. Perceptual facts to be sieved would include the use of a line 
to represent an edge, juxtaposition of two complementary hues, and gradual 
tonal shift to create an illusion of form. 
What would this visual substantial similarity test look like? When 
applied to the elaborate alphabet quilts in Boisson, we end up with a result 
that differs from the court’s holding. Recall that the court found “enormous 
amount of sameness” between the two quilts noting that “[i]n particular, the 
overwhelming similarities in color choices lean toward a finding of 
infringement.”217 To arrive at the conclusion that the two quilts were 
substantially similar, the court used abstract and isolated visual concepts 
such as a “green square” or a “red square” as units of analysis.218  
We saw, however, in Part II that a colored shape is never perceived in 
isolation; the brain simply does not have a mechanism for seeing an 
absolute color or an absolute shape. A unit of analysis that reflects the 
nature of human perception would be a “green square juxtaposed to a red 
square” and the perceptual fact that the artist used is the juxtaposition of 
217 Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 274 (2d Cir. 2001). 
218 See supra Section I.C.1. 
Perceptual Facts 
gradual tonal 






use of line to 
indicate edge 
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complementary colors. Since perceptual facts are techniques derived from 
human perception, it would be, like all facts, filtered out. However, 
perceptual facts would still work fine as viable and plausible units of 
comparison because the way in which perceptual facts are combined and 
used make up the protectible visual expression. In other words, like the 
notes in a musical composition, perceptual facts combine to form the 
pictorial composition. 
Once we start to visually analyze the images using perceptual facts, 
we can “see” that the defendant’s quilts in Boisson are not substantially 
similar to the plaintiff’s quilts. First, in the filtration step, the shape of the 
letters, i.e., the fonts, and the colored grid would be filtered out. The 
concept of a colored square containing two contrasting colors is a 
perceptual fact. And finally, at the most general level of abstraction, we 
would filter out the idea of an alphabet quilt. The more discerning 
observers can then analyze how the overall color palette used in the two 
works significantly differ, even if some of the same hues were used. On the 
left, the plaintiff used a low chroma palette with less value contrast 
between the tone of the letter and the square. On the right, the defendant 
used more intense colors and greater value contrast between the tone of the 
letter and the square. Though a single color or juxtaposition of colors to 
create a certain visual impression is a perceptual fact, the holistic selection 
of a color palette across the picture plane is a combination of perceptual 
facts that results in a creative expression.  
Furthermore, the two artists used different design composition. The 
plaintiff relied less on tonal or hue contrasts than the defendant did, which 
means that the defendant’s work has a greater sense of foreground–
background distinction. Given that the defendant used a different overall 
color scheme and arranged the range of these colors on a palette differently 
across the picture surface, the factfinder should conclude that the 
defendant’s quilt is not substantially similar to the plaintiff’s quilt—a result 
that contradicts what the court held regarding this pair of quilts. 
Those who support strong copyright protection might balk at filtering 
out perceptual facts because what is filtered out is ultimately unusable in 
proving actionable copying. Section III.C explores a response to this 
objection more extensively, but, in short, copyright’s idea–expression 
dichotomy calls for filtering facts. Perceptual facts, though in some sense 
unlike the fact types more familiar to us (e.g., sixty seconds in a minute), 
are nonetheless facts. These facts detail the techniques about how the eye 
and the brain perceive images. 
The primary value of this visual test, however, is not simply 
demonstrating how some PGS cases might have come out differently or its 
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forward-looking predictive power when applied to future cases. Rather, this 
test’s greater potential contribution would be to provide the courts with a 
visual language that can consistently be applied, thereby redeeming the 
total concept and feel test for PGS works. 
Perhaps justly, courts have been ambivalent about the total concept 
and feel test.219 On the one hand, the test is doctrinally sound.220 The test, at 
least in theory, correctly protects visual composition in a way that a classic 
abstraction test cannot.221 On the other hand, when actually applied to 
comparison of PGS works, the test feels flimsy. Looking at “overall feel or 
gestalt” sounds like there is “a sort of magic” to the process, which is not at 
all rigorous.222 The paradigmatic example of this problem appears in Roth 
Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., where the court found substantial 
similarity between two greetings cards despite the fact that the plaintiff’s 
allegedly copied work was a simple drawing composed of unprotectible 
subject matters and trite sayings.223 Rebecca Tushnet remarked, expressing 
the sentiment shared by many judges and copyright scholars, that “Roth is 
misguided . . . . Roth illustrates that the gestalt approach expands protection 
unpredictably.”224 But it is important to remember that the problem with the 
total concept and feel test is not the theory behind it but the lack of a truly 
visual unit for performing a dissection of PGS works. Using perceptual 
facts as analytical units can help redeem the total concept and feel test, 
converting it into a rigorous test that protects compilation of perceptual 
facts without protecting those techniques themselves.225 
The difficulties in maneuvering through the current test is exemplified 
in Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., where the court 
considered the similarities between a movie and magazine poster.226 In 
Steinberg, the court “spent a substantial portion of its time discussing the 
similarities of unprotectible elements, such as stylized font used in the title” 
and ultimately conflated actual and actionable copying to conclude 
219 See, e.g., Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 
2003) (“Some commentators have worried that the ‘total concept and feel’ standard may ‘invite[] an 
abdication of analysis,’ because ‘feel’ can seem a ‘wholly amorphous referent.’” (citation omitted)). 
220 See PATRY, supra note 12, § 9:73 (“If applied correctly, the more discerning observer test goes a 
long way toward resolving the inherent tensions in the total-concept-and-feel test.”).
221 See supra Section I.C.1.
222 Tushnet, supra note 20, at 718. 
223 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970). 
224 Tushnet, supra note 20, at 719. 
225 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012) (“The subject matter of copyright . . . includes compilations . . . .”). 
226 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). For a side-by-side comparison of the magazine cover and 
movie poster, see Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Steinberg_v._Columbia_Pictures_Industries,_Inc. [https//perma.cc/R7WS-T4Z7]. 
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substantial similarity between the two works based on overlap of many 
details.227 This illustrates that in the absence of a visual analytical language, 
the courts can make serious doctrinal errors. 
Providing the courts with a visual analytic unit to perform a truly 
visual substantial similarity test has inherent and important value even if it 
does not change the case’s outcome. For example, the Steinberg court 
correctly held that the defendant’s movie poster is substantially similar to 
the plaintiff’s New Yorker Magazine cover.228 Despite this correct result, 
the court’s reasoning was replete with both of the problematic tendencies 
identified in Section I.C. First, the court used a literal descriptive analysis 
to the extreme, cataloging then comparing identifiable objects that appear 
in both images such as: “approximately four city blocks,” “water towers,” 
“the red sign above a parking lot, and . . . many of the individual 
buildings.”229 The court also committed the erroneous myopic visual 
analysis by comparing isolated visual concepts, such as linear perspective 
(“a bird’s eye view”), colored shapes (“narrow band of blue wash” and “a 
band of primary red”), and font (“the childlike, spiky block print”).230 
As the Steinberg court grasped for a meaningful visual analysis, it also 
committed two additional doctrinal errors. First, the holding’s rationale is 
simply ad hoc. They used vague concepts such as “sketchy, whimsical 
style” and “New York-ish structures” as a basis for copyright protection.231 
It cannot be true that copyright protection is rooted in such fanciful and 
arbitrary concepts. Second, the court conflates probative and substantial 
similarity when it concluded that “[t]he close similarity can be explained 
only by the defendant . . . having copied the plaintiff’s work.”232 While the 
fact that the defendant “meticulously imitated” the plaintiff’s cover proves 
actual copying, the court should not collapse this notion onto the concept of 
actionable copying.233 
As previously mentioned, the court reached the correct result despite 
its erroneous reasoning; even under the proposed test, these two works 
would be deemed substantially similar.234 For example, although the 
227 Lemley, supra note 48, at 721.  
228 Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
229 Id. at 712–13. 
230 Id. Although theoretically some lettering art can be creative enough to be protectible expression, 
the Copyright Office declared that “lettering” and “mere variations of typographic ornamentation” are 
“not subject to copyright.” 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2016). 
231 Steinberg, 663 F. Supp. at 712–13. 
232 Id. at 713. 
233 See discussion supra Section I.A. 
234 Of course substantial similarity does not require an exact match. Even though the two images 
have many differences—one prominent example being the three figures in the foreground of the image 
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perceptual facts such as converging lines are filtered out, both artworks use 
two converging lines to create holistically similar visual composition using 
similar color palettes. The two works also share similar spatial design of 
the page consisting of three vertical rectangles alternating in warm-cool-
warm tones indicates substantial similarity in the total concept and feel of 
the visual expressions. Note that the concentrated use of warm tones to 
visually separate out a top rectangular space in itself is an unprotectible 
perceptual fact. Otherwise, the works in the Steinberg case would be 
substantially similar to a Rothko painting containing an orange–red 
rectangle at the top. However, the two works are substantially similar 
because they overlap in the cumulative mix of the perceptual facts used to 
create a compositional design. The use of predominantly warm colors in 
the top third of the landscape creates a cityscape that jarringly shifts from a 
bird-eye view to a flat front head-on view. This decision to mix a tonal 
contrast with perspective shift creates in the viewer a sense of a vertical 
walling that cuts short a visual journey across the world. What results then 
is a protectible picture composition made up of a particular mix of 
perceptual facts. 
A comparison to the more doctrinally well-established substantial 
similarity test for literary works confirms the soundness and viability of 
this truly visual substantial similarity test. The distinction in literary works 
between uncopyrightable stock characters and copyrightable plot characters 
nicely demonstrates the distinction between a technique contained in 
perceptual facts and expression resulting from the combination of 
perceptual facts. In analyzing the copyright of plots, “stereotyped” or stock 
characters are “the products not of the creative imagination but of simple 
observation of the human comedy.”235  
Similarly, perceptual facts in visual works are not themselves the 
product of creative imagination, but artistic technique derived from the 
study of human visual perception. In Gaiman, the Seventh Circuit 
explained that a comic artist was able to create a copyrightable character 
because “what [the character] knows and says, his name, and his . . . facial 
features combine to create a distinctive character.”236 Applied to the visual 
works in Steinberg, the convergence of two lines that create the illusion of 
depth is a perceptual fact, one that would be expected in creating a 
cityscape and therefore—much like stock characters of a particular literary 
on the right—as long as a significant amount of the plaintiff’s expression is taken, actionable copying 
has occurred. 
235 See Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660 (7th Cir. 2004). 
236 Id. Therefore a “drunken old bum” is but a character with “a specific name and a specific 
appearance” and so is not a stock character. Id. 
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genre—is not copyrightable. Similarly, the technique of creating an illusion 
of a generic road receding into space using narrowing, converging lines is 
an unprotectible perceptual fact. However, the following visual decisions in 
the plaintiff’s work based on perceptual facts are indeed protectible: 
orienting the road of a particular width and length in the middle of the 
page, bringing the road halfway up the cityscape to draw the eye from the 
bottom to the top of the page to create the illusion of looking far out into 
the world, and deciding to make the road a different hue but the same 
value237 to create a map-like effect. In sum, perceptual facts must be 
combined into an artistic composition of a picture to be visual expression 
eligible for copyright protection. 
* *  *
The concern with any proposed test, of course, is whether it can be 
implemented.238 Allowing expert testimony at the substantial similarity 
step, as we do in music copyright infringement cases, would facilitate the 
application of the visual substantial similarity test this Note proposes.239 
Factfinders have trouble with visual analysis.240 Perhaps judges 
understandably feel more in control with textual comparisons where they 
are aided by “many standardized tools to interpret text, not least of all the 
rules of statutory and contractual construction.”241 For example, even Judge 
Learned Hand, who called the boundary between idea and expression 
“inherently arbitrary,” seemed right at home engaging in a detailed literary 
analysis of plays.242 To make matters worse, factfinders for substantial 
similarity analysis may be influenced by other information they receive, 
such as information related to how hard the artist labored.243 
Additionally, as explored in Part II, visual training is required before 
visual dissection can be done objectively and accurately. Indeed without 
experts, “judges and juries are more likely to find infringement in dubious 
237 Value, as you recall in the discussion from Section II.B, is the degree of darkness of a given 
patch of color. If you completely close one eye and squint the other eye down as you look at the 
plaintiff’s then the defendant’s work, you will see that the road blends into the buildings because the 
road and the buildings are in fact similar in their light–dark value. 
238 Tushnet, supra note 20, at 733. 
239 Of course there are challenges with using experts too, but the topic falls outside the scope of this 
Note. 
240 Tushnet, supra note 20, at 734. 
241 Id. at 702. 
242 Id. 
243 A study, for example, shows that factfinders “are sensitive to additional information about the 
two works and the creators who produced them” when making substantial similarity determinations. 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Irina D. Manta & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Judging Similarity, 100 IOWA L. 
REV. 267, 271 (2014). 
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circumstances, because they [are not] properly educated on the difference 
between protectable and unprotectable elements.”244 Therefore, experts 
should be used at the abstraction and filtration stage of visual substantial 
similarity analysis.245 This might increase litigation costs. However, the use 
of experts in copyright cases is already common. For example, in Newton v. 
Diamond, a Ninth Circuit musical composition copyright infringement 
case, expert testimony helped show that a portion of a musical composition 
that appears in both works “is merely a common, trite, and generic three-
note sequence” that is “a common building block tool” that composers 
often use.246 If experts can help guide the court in isolating functional 
musical units of composition, experts can aid the court in discerning visual 
perceptual units of composition.247 Some circuits are already open to using 
experts for PGS works.248 We should now make it the norm. 
C. Visual Substantial Similarity Analysis and Copyright Policy
The substantial similarity analysis is what allows us to condemn only
actionable infringement. If this test is meaningless, then we are either 
underdeterring or overdeterring creative expression. The courts are thus 
charged with “an important responsibility in copyright cases to monitor the 
outer limits within which juries may determine reasonably disputed issues 
of fact,” so as not to “enlarge (or diminish) the scope of statutory protection 
enjoyed by a copyright proprietor.”249 Therefore, new substantial similarity 
standards should further copyright’s policy of filtering out facts and 
processes while protecting original visual expression. 
This, of course, does not necessarily mean that the visual substantial 
similarity test has to be dictated by science if the science deviates from 
values inherent to a legal test.250 However, the test proposed in this Note is 
aligned with the goals of copyright protection, filtering out unprotectible 
244 Lemley, supra note 48, at 739. 
245 See Eric Rogers, Substantially Unfair: An Empirical Examination of Copyright Substantial 
Similarity Analysis Among the Federal Circuits, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 893, 917 (stating that the 
introduction of expert testimony into substantial similarity analysis is a “popular suggestion”). 
246 388 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
247 See, e.g., Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., 2015 WL 4479500 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (discussing a 
substantial similarity analysis that resulted in a battle of experts). 
248 See, e.g., Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 293–95 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[E]xpert 
testimony would be necessary to determine whether certain elements of such a latch should be excluded 
from the substantial similarity analysis.” (citation omitted)).  
249 Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 245 (2d Cir. 1983). Indeed, Judge Learned 
Hand also said that the court has to “decide how much” is enough for copyrightable expression; even 
though the court is “as aware as any one that the line, wherever it is drawn, will seem arbitrary, [it] is no 
excuse for not drawing it.” Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930). 
250 Tushnet, supra note 175, at 510. 
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visual principles while simultaneously granting copyright protection to 
visual expression. 
In fact, this test clarifies the nuanced divide between idea and 
expression by showing that the artistic techniques themselves do not 
receive any copyright protection. First, filtering out perceptual facts shows 
that copyright protection is not for one’s labor. Even recently, without a 
rigorous visual test, courts have erroneously protected “inventive efforts” 
and techniques such as “posing the subjects, lighting, angle, selection of 
film and camera” in addition to protectible “evo[cation of] the desired 
expression.”251 However, “‘[s]weat of the brow’ is not the touchstone of 
copyright” because copyright protection “derives from the features of the 
work itself, not the effort that goes into it.”252 
Second, perceptual facts, like all techniques, should fall outside 
copyright protection because they are unprotectible processes. Therefore, 
analyzing visual works in terms of how the combination of perceptual facts 
results in visual expression would only protect original creative expression 
while leaving open to the public the raw material for creation. The 
Copyright Code explicitly draws the line between unprotectible “process” 
and protectible “original work of authorship.”253 This idea has already been 
built into the copyright infringement analysis. For example, in analyzing 
literary works, scenes a faire or the expression that “flow[s] naturally from 
generic plot-lines” are not deemed protectible expression.254 There is no 
reason why perceptual facts inherent in expressing visual ideas should be 
treated differently and become candidates for copyright protection. 
To illustrate the point that a technique–fact cannot be copyrighted—
no matter how much labor went into obtaining it—Alan Durham gives the 
following helpful example: even if the population of New Jersey was 
determined by personally knocking on every door and counting every 
inhabitant, only the “fact in distinctive rhetoric,” but not the fact itself (i.e., 
the population), is copyrightable expression.255 Similarly, although an artist 
spends many years in apprenticeship learning perceptual facts and how to 
251 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992). 
252 Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (footnote omitted). 
253 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process . . . regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” (emphasis added)); cf. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 
(1879) (holding that processes are not copyrightable because they would be protected, if at all, through 
a patent rather than a copyright). 
254 Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2006). 
255 Alan L. Durham, Speaking of the World: Fact, Opinion, and the Originality Standard of 
Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION OF FACT-BASED WORKS: COPYRIGHT AND ITS 
ALTERNATIVES 133, 133–34 (Robert F. Brauneis ed., 2009) (footnotes omitted).  
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manipulate them, and even if an artist through individual ingenuity 
discovers them, the fact of how human vision gathers contrasting 
relationships in the visual field to form an image cannot be copyrighted. 
Craftsmanship, therefore, is not a copyrightable basis for substantial 
similarity analysis.256 And neither is expertise.257 Instead, the manifested 
unique combinations of perceptual facts are copyrightable expression. This 
expression, of course, need not be brilliant—a “faint spark” is sufficient to 
meet the low threshold for copyrightable originality.258 This maintains the 
bargain the law has given authors: copyright, exclusive monopolistic 
protection, is extended for the layer of expression added rather than 
underlying facts. 
Filtering out perceptual facts, however, does not necessarily mean less 
copyright protection for artistic works. Current tests leave open the 
possibility of abstracting and filtering out all aspects of a visual work. 
Therefore, a defendant can press the courts to find most of the work, if not 
the entire work, unprotectible.259 One of the steps is to “dissect each 
element into the smallest parts possible,” a clever manipulation that is 
possible under the current unrigorous set of substantial similarity tests.260 
Under a more rigorous visual test with a standard opening size for the 
substantial similarity sieve, it is possible to simultaneously increase 
meaningful protection and practice principled filtering. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note identified the two problematic tendencies that result in the 
substantial similarity test for PGS works. This Note then turned to the 
science of vision and artistic practices to derive analytical units called 
perceptual facts. Finally, this Note proposed a truly visual substantial 
similarity test that uses the perceptual facts as an analytical unit. This test 
would allow for appropriate filtering of perceptual facts that artists use to 
compose pictures. At the same time, the manipulation of these visual facts 
in composing the image, i.e., the visual expression, receives meaningful 
copyright protection. The greatest strength of the test is that it allows the 
256 Cf. Yurman Studio Inc., v. Castaneda, 591 F. Supp. 2d 471, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Although an 
observer . . . might notice that the quality of craftsmanship . . . is lower . . . that difference alone would 
not allow a reasonable juror to find” a lack of substantial similarity.). 
257 Cf. Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that “a 
great deal of effort and expertise” into creating a reproduction does not make it protectible expression). 
258 Durham, supra note 255, at 135. 
259 See, e.g., Rachel Wallace, Framing the Issue: Avoiding a Substantial Similarity Finding in 
Reproduced Visual Art, 10 WASH. J.L. TECH & ARTS 89 (2014) (a manual for defendants of copyright 
infringement for images that contained “practice pointers” aimed at maximizing filtration). 
260 Id. at 108. 
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courts and copyright scholars to figure out the exact contour of the divide 
between perceptual facts and visual expression, allowing for a proper 
application of the total concept and feel test. The proposed test incorporates 
both an appropriate filtration and comparison to delineate the scope of a 
copyright protection that advances copyright’s dual policy goals: 
incentivize creation and promote free dissemination of unprotectible ideas 
and facts. 
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